A Watchdog For P/CVE Content?

Regulation scares many. Despite this, we will ask the question: is there a need for a watchdog when it comes to documents on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE)?

The question is of much importance. After all, something positive can in many cases be turned to something negative. Specifically, research output on P/CVE is often technical in nature. The findings, in the wrong hands, can be used in a multitude of ways, for good and for worse.

Luckily enough, extremists are a minority. While it is surmisable that information extracted from P/CVE research reports goes viral, possibly undetected or hardly recognized, we must come to the realization that content is socially produced, and this plays to our advantage. Let me state two hypotheses, in this context:

1) terrorist cells and organizations lack manpower and expertise in comparison with official and semi-official institutions.

2) C/PVE documents can influence and corrode the morale and ideas of terrorists and terrorist organizations.

While some of the publications and videos of extremists and terrorists are suprisingly professional and bear a certain appeal with reference to their evil following, extremists and terrorists are not in a position to stage a counter-operation rivaling the abilities of civilised institutions such as states or supranatinoal organisations, in scale, scope or quality.

How best to ensure that the terrorists are not empowered but their morale and ideas are contested? First, there is no reason to embargo P/CVE material in general. A plentitude of documents is is out in the open, has been for years and has proven valuable for researchers and practitioners. The downsides of this practice of publication are minor, according to all appearance. Were the material to be classified or censored, terrorists could, instead of consulting P/CVE documents, take university lessons and learn from literary studies or marketing textbooks to enhance their propaganda efforts, just to name a few examples.

But how to achieve that the second hypothesis stated above proves to be correct? One ought to always contextualize and position oneself as a researcher. One might, then, ask: why am I to justify myself? The answer is simple: because information and communication is a contested terrain, particularly when it comes to counter-extremism. In recent years, we have seen communication bubbles popping up, with groups of terrorists consuming only or mainly information which has been rewritten with radical notions in mind, be it technical information or religious texts.

With respect to P/CVE documents, we need to try and create dissonance in the mind of the extremists who read our texts (at the same time confirming the world view of readers with good and peaceful intentions). We can then expect the benefit of the doubt to persist, to a certain degree, and hope to shatter the deviance within the minds of the extremists. While this does not mean that we can destroy whole organizations, we can do our share in weakening them by targeting their chains of textual consumption.

Hence, P/CVE documents, scientific as they are, should become more opinionated and persuasive overall. It might be a start to include generic referrals and emotive designations opposing terrorism, however, even manuals can and should be value-based, originally crafted narratives instead of impartial, relativist science.

With a proper sense of responsibility and fulfilling the role of gate-keepers, there may be no need to instore watchdogs for P/CVE material after all. In any event, P/CVE researchers and practitioners should take care to let their anti-terrorist positions shine through while drafting papers and other research documents, in a sophisticated manner, in order to guarantee that their texts bring about the desired and necessary result, not just in application, but already during the reception and exposure phase of their texts: to counter terrorism.

Ethical Issues Related to Communication and CT

Communication efforts within operations of counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism (CT) are crucial for the success of approaches chosen by a government body, private or civil society organisation. However, ethical questions may arise.

We will lay out some key issues which are more or less likely to cause concerns:

  • arbitrary goals and objectives
  • excessive or inadequate measures (substantially, structurally and in time)
  • disproportionate leveraging
  • unwarranted misgivens in mitigation and through delegation
  • misappropriations of operational leads
  • intransparencies
  • nepotism
  • corruption
  • spreading in trying to limit ripple effects (expansionism)
  • perceived irreversibility (due to erroneous determinism)
  • monism and binary thinking
  • maintenance of ops or associated, underlying assumptions
  • irrational group effects, reinforced by a lack of good leadership
  • gaps in practitioner training

There have certainly been tendencies towards inappropriate scale, scope, and intransparencies. They can, but need not, be due to hidden agendas.

Highly questionable is alleged irreversibility, even after errs, leading up to a continuation of unethical operations, which may be condoned by op leaders. (I hint to the fact that psychological operations are linked to sustenance.) There can, hence, be tendencies toward continuations of patterns of actions by agents (clinging, possibly due to bandwagonism), whereas an op is no longer legitimimizable. Agents may have previously misconstrued, or still consider themselves to be tasked.

All of the above calls for diligent planning, execution, mechanisms of control and oversight.

How the 9/11 and 7/7 Terror Attacks Have Hurt UK Muslims

Islamophobia existed prior to 9/11, but levels of discrimination and violence rose after the violent events. In reaction, implicit racism remained considerable long afterwards. Similarly, after the 7/7 attacks, faith-hate crime augmented significantly, and the negative depictions of Muslims were disproportionate.

A large majority of Muslims rejected political aggression and terrorism after the occurrences of violent extremism, although a few displayed some empathy with the tribulations of the attackers. Most UK Muslims keep identifying strongly with Britain.

Among steps to counter terrorism, the Prevent programme stresses social interaction on the community level. Its measures are supported by the greater part of Muslim communities in the UK.

For the full contribution by Thorsten Koch, MA (April 2017), read or download the PDF hosted by academia:

http://bit.ly/2FPPJ5Y

Positive and Negative Measures of Anti-Terrorism

ARC Europe (Anti-Radicalisation Centres Initiative) embraces soft anti-terrorism and passive strategic means in the domestic fight of European countries against terrorism. What ARC Europe does not condone is unethical tactics. Below, we provide a non-exhaustive list of methods we tend to support and such which are generally unsupported by our NGO.

Efforts which should be held as sustainable:

  • use of positive influencing from family and friends
  • positive incentives and empowerment through education and work
  • use of tendentially harmless PR techniques
  • lawful information gathering
  • below-threshold warnings and referrals to legal provisions
  • use of discourse such as one-by-one dialog (e.g. with social workers)
  • financial controls
  • removal of criminal content from the internet
  • judicial measures such punitive fines, community service and detainment

Measures which are unsustainable:

  • fully-fledged psychological attacks
  • use of psychoactive drugs
  • unlawful use of kinetic weapons
  • use of unconventional weapons
  • overreaching application of information technology
  • capital punishment
  • unlawful, pseudo-judicial measures to attain particularist political ends
  • other applications leading to different kinds of individual and societal dysfunction

As always, an over-reliance, in this case on anti-terrorist utilities, bears the tendency of yielding unwarranted, negative effects. Foreseeably (especially irreparable) damage to the physical integrity of a person and to the integrity of society is, indeed, absolutely reprehensible. Measures causing physical and psychological harm have partly been banned by international conventions already.

A note to political decision-makers: he who has the means and tools of anti-terrorism at his disposal risks excess in the application of measures up to so-called extreme measures. The idea of a guided society is an enticement which has to be prevented at all cost. It runs against the principles of religion and humanism. Using a range of policing and psychological tools and measures systematically can breach the principles of human rights, and at the advent of mass-use of artificial intelligence, can either negatively enhance the capabilities of terrorists or stride to the level of the above-mentioned dystopia of a guided society, which we advocate against.

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